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Abstract
Many group-oriented applications in distributed systems, such as teleconferencing and cooperative
works, involve dynamic peer groups. In order to secure communications in dynamic peer groups,
authenticated key agreement protocols are required. In this paper, we propose a new authenticated key
agreement protocol, composed of a basic protocol and a dynamic protocol, for dynamic peer groups.
With the basic protocol, a secret group key can be achieved in a peer group via group handshake,
secret broadcast, key derivation and key conﬁrmation phases. By the dynamic protocol, a new secret
group key can be reached when member or mass join, group mergence, group division, member or
mass quit occurs in a dynamic peer group. Security analysis shows that our protocol offers explicit
group key authentication and prevents from both passive and active attacks. In our basic protocol, each
group member equally contributes to the secret group key in parallel and guarantees key freshness.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
With increasing use of distributed systems, group-oriented applications [4,27] have be-
come an important feature of the distributed system technology. Generally, a group-oriented
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Fig. 1. Generic model of a group-oriented application in the distributed system.
application in the distributed system involves a group of members G = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}
connected via wired or wireless communications as shown in Fig. 1.
When a groupmember broadcasts a message through the shared communication channel,
the rest of the group can receive the message. A typical example of group-oriented appli-
cations in distributed systems is teleconferencing—a synchronous collaborative session in
which conferees at remote locations cooperate in an interactive procedure, such as a board
meeting, a task force, a scientiﬁc discussion or even a virtual classroom, through wired or
wireless communications. The major advantage of group-oriented applications in distribute
systems lies in delivering a single message to multiple receivers and thereby minimizing
the volume of communication trafﬁc.
However, anyone with an appropriate receiving device can eavesdrop messages broad-
casted on the public communication channel and this kind of eavesdropping is virtually
undetectable. The best solution to this problem is to encrypt broadcasting messages. En-
cryption is generally carried out by either secret-key or public-key cryptosystems. State-of-
the-art public-key cryptosystems with high security, such as RSA [26], are usually much
slower than secret-key cryptosystems, such asDES [7], IDEA [22] andAES [10]. In practice,
secret-key cryptosystems are commonly used to encrypt “long” messages in communica-
tions.
Secret-key cryptosystems are designed in accordance with Shannon’s secure commu-
nication system model [28]. According to this model, in order to perform encryption, the
sender and the recipient must share a common secret key at ﬁrst. In the scenario of a group-
oriented application in the distributed system, it means that all group members must share a
common secret group key before starting secure group communications. Thus, the problem
of key establishment among a group in the distributed system comes out.
Key establishment is a process whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more
parties, for subsequent cryptographic use. Key establishment is either key distribution or
key agreement. Key distribution is a mechanism whereby one party chooses a secret key
and then transmits it to another party or parties. Key agreement is a mechanism in which a
shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information contributed
by, or associated with, each of them, (ideally) such that no party can predetermine the
resulting value [23]. Key distribution is suitable for key establishment among groups with
ﬁxed trusted third parties. Such examples includes the well-known Kerberos system [21],
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Fig. 2. (a) A-GDH.2 and (b) SA-GDH.2.
conference key distribution schemes proposed in [12–14] and multicast key distribution
scheme suggested in [2].
Many group-oriented applications in distributed systems, such as teleconferencing and
cooperative works, involve dynamic peer groups. A dynamic peer group can be viewed as
a group in which any group member can join or quit a group with freedom while group
members are peer entities. Accordingly, dynamic peer groups do not contain any trusted
third parities. Therefore, key distribution cannot be used in key establishment among such
groups. This security need can be fulﬁlled only by key agreement.
Several key agreement protocols for dynamic peer groups were proposed by Steiner
et al. in literatures [29–31]. Steiner et al.’s protocols are based on multiparty extensions
of the well-known Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement protocol [6] and have the minimal total
number of broadcasting messages. Unfortunately, Steiner et al. state that their protocols
are not secure against active attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle attack [32] in which
an intruder intercepts messages between the sender and the recipient and substitutes his
own messages. The man-in-the-middle attack is undetectable to the group in Steiner et al.’s
protocols [29–31]. The security vulnerability originates from no identity authentication
among group members in these protocols. Hence, a group key agreement protocol should
itself authenticate group members’ identities at the same time as a secret group key is being
established. Such a protocol is called authenticated group key agreement protocol.
Some authenticated group key agreement protocols can be found in [1,3,16]. But some
of them cannot prevent two or more group members from colluding to cheat the rest of the
group. Let us take the authenticated group Difﬁe–Hellman protocolA-GDH.2 in [1] shown
in Fig. 2(a) for example.
In Fig. 2(a), (xi, yi) (where yi = gxi (mod p), gq (mod p) = 1, p and q are primes)
stands for the private and public keys of member Ui . A-GDH.2 runs in n rounds. In
the ﬁrst round, U1 randomly selects r1 from GF(q)∗, computes and sends gr1 (mod p)
to U2; In the ith round (1 < i < n), Ui randomly selects ri from GF(q)∗, computes
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and sends gr1...ri/rj (mod p) (0j i and ro = 1) to Ui+1; In the last round, Un ran-
domly selects rn fromGF(q)∗, computes and broadcasts gr1...rn/rikin (mod p) (1 in−1,
kin = F(yxni (mod p)) and F is a map from GF(p) to GF(q)). Upon receipt of it, Ui
(1 i < n) computes kin = F(yxin (mod p)) and the group key k = (gr1...rn/rikin )k−1in ri =
gr1...rn (mod p).
In A-GDH.2, if Un is not trusted, an attacker A can impersonate any user Uj (except
existing group members) to participate in a secure group communication by colluding with
Un as follows: The ﬁrst n− 1 rounds are the same as described above. In the last round, Un
computes and broadcasts gr1...rn/rikin (mod p) (i = j ) and gr1...rn/rj (mod p). Without xj ,
A can still compute the group key k = (gr1...rn/rj )rj = gr1...rn (mod p).
The collusion attack is virtually undetectable to the rest of the group. The security vulner-
ability originates from no identity authentication between arbitraryUi andUj inA-GDH.2.
This drawback in A-GDH.2 has been overcome in the group Difﬁe–Hellman protocol
with complete key authentication SA-GDH.2 in [1] shown in Fig. 2(b). In Fig. 2(b), after
receiving gr1...rn/rj kj1...kjn/kjj (mod p), Uj computes the secret group key k =
(gr1...rn/rj kj1...kjn/kjj )rj (kj1...kjn/kjj )
−1 = gr1...rn (mod p).
SA-GDH.2 allows each group member to authenticate the rest of the group in the same
time as the secret group key is being established. In addition, SA-GDH.2 is almost com-
putationally symmetric, i.e., each member performs almost the same computation process.
However, SA-GDH.2 is imperfect in the sense that
(1) SA-GDH.2 assumes that each pair of groupmembers share a long-term secret key drawn
from the secret key of one person and the public key of another person. However, the
authenticity of the long-term key is not considered in SA-GDH.2.
(2) SA-GDH.2 is not message-independent in the sense that the message sent to the subse-
quent group member by each group member (except the ﬁrst one) relies on the message
received from the foregoing group member.
(3) SA-GDH.2 is carried out in series and thereby its total running time is n times as long
as that of a group member running SA-GDH.2.
In this paper, we propose a new authenticated key agreement protocol, composed of a basic
protocol and a dynamic protocol, for dynamic peer groups to overcome the above problems.
Considering the broadcast characteristic of group—oriented applications, our protocol is
carried out in parallel through group handshake, secret broadcast, key derivation and key
conﬁrmation phases. Our protocol offers explicit group key authentication and withstands
not only the passive attack but also the active attack.
The remainder of this paper are arranged as follows. Section 2 describes our authenticated
group key agreement protocol. Section 3 and Section 4 analyze the security and performance
of our protocol. Conclusion is drawn in the last section.
2. Description of our protocol
Our protocol focuses on a relatively small nonhierarchical peer group inwhich no speciﬁc
communication paradigm (e.g., PRC) is favored and no assumptions are made about either
the topology or technology of the underlying network. The only premise of our protocol
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is that each group member Uj holds a public-key certiﬁcate Certj issued by a certiﬁcation
authority CA.
2.1. Certiﬁcate issue
Certiﬁcation authority (CA) is a trusted third party whose signature on a certiﬁcate
vouches for the authenticity of a public key bound to a user. A certiﬁcate is a vehicle
by which a public key is stored, distributed or forwarded over unsecured media without
danger of undetectable manipulation. The objective of a certiﬁcate is to make one user’s
public key available to others such that its authenticity (i.e., its status as the true public
key of that user) and validity are veriﬁable. In practice, X.509 certiﬁcates are commonly
used. The initial version of X.509 [5] was published in 1988, version 2 was published in
1993, and version 3 was proposed in 1994 and considered for approval in 1995. Version 3
addresses some of the security concerns and limited ﬂexibility that were issues in versions 1
and 2. The ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [15] was approved on 31March 2000. Directory
authentication in X.509 can be carried out using public key techniques based on public key
certiﬁcates. The format of X.509 certiﬁcate is shown in Fig. 3.
A certiﬁcate is signed by an issuer, i.e., CA, to authenticate the binding between a user’s
name and his public key. X.509 standard is supported by a number of protocols, including
PEM [17,18], PKCS [24], S-HTTP [25] and SSL [11].
In order to provide ﬂexibility for an authorized user to change his private–public keys,
CA issues a certiﬁcate as follows.
Key generation: Similar to the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [9], CA chooses three
parameters (p, q, g), where p is a large prime, q is a large prime factor of p − 1, g =
(p−1)/q (mod p)with  being an integer satisfying 1< <p− 1 and (p−1)/q (mod p)> 1.
Then CA determines a pair of its signature private–public keys (xCA, yCA) such that
yCA = gxCA (mod p), (1)
where xCA is chosen randomly from GF(q)∗(= {1, 2, . . . , q − 1}) by CA.
Afterwards, CA selects an one-way hash function (h), such as the Secure Hash Standard
(SHS) [8], mapping its input with arbitrary length into a substantial subset of GF(q).
Finally, CA publishes (p, q, g, h, yCA), but keeps xCA secret. In other word, (p, q, g, h,
yCA) is known to all participants, but xCA is known only to CA.
According to the public (p, q, g), each participant Uj determines a pair of his private-
public keys (xjo, yjo) such that
yjo = gxjo (mod p), (2)
where xjo is chosen randomly from GF(q)∗ by Uj and known only to himself.
Signature generation: For an authorized user Uj with the public key yjo, suppose that
the contents of Uj ’s certiﬁcate (i.e., excluding the issuer’s signature in Fig. 3) is denoted as
CertContjo. CA generates its signature Signjo on CertContjo as follows:
(1) Select a random secret integer kjo such that 1 < kjo < q and compute
rjo = gkjo · yjo (mod p). (3)
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Fig. 3. X.509 certiﬁcate format.
(2) Put rjo into the user public key information ﬁeld shown in Fig. 3 instead of yjo.
(3) Compute
sjo = xCA · h(CertContjo)+ kjo (mod q), (4)
where h(CertContjo) stands for the hash value of CertContjo with one-way hash func-
tion h.
(4) Output Signjo = sjo.
Finally, CA issues to Uj a certiﬁcate
Certjo = {CertContjo‖Signjo},
where ‖ stands for the concatenation of two messages.
Signature veriﬁcation: After receiving Certjo from CA, Uj checks that
gsjo = rjoy−1jo y
h(CertContjo)
CA (mod p). (5)
If Eq. (5) holds, Uj accepts Certjo.
Theorem 1. If yCA, rjo, sjo are computed according to formulae (1), (3) and (4), then
Eq. (5) holds.
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Proof. From formula (4), we have
gsjo = gxCAh(CertContjo)gkjo (mod p). (6)
Based on formulae (1) and (3), we conclude that Eq. (5) holds. 
2.2. Our basic protocol
Our basic protocol aims at reaching an agreement on a secret group key k among a peer
group G = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} shown in Fig. 1 via four phases—group handshake, secret
broadcast, key derivation and key conﬁrmation as follows.
2.2.1. Group handshake
Assume that each group member Uj holds a certiﬁcate Certjo issued by CA. In order
to prevent from impersonating, it is necessary for each group member to authenticate the
bindings between the other n− 1 group members’ identities and their public keys. Accord-
ingly, groupmembers should shake hands by broadcasting their certiﬁcates over an insecure
channel and authenticating certiﬁcates each other.
Before certiﬁcate broadcast, each groupmemberUj randomly chooses two secret integers
xj , kj such that 1 < xj , kj < q and computes
yj = gxj (mod p), (7)
rj = gkj (mod p), (8)
sj = (sjo + xjo)h(rjo‖rj‖yj‖u)+ kj (mod q), (9)
where xjo is only known to Uj and u = U1‖U2‖ · · · ‖Un‖T (T is the time when the peer
group form).
Note 1: (xj , yj ) such that yj = gxj (mod p) is a pair of Uj ’s one-time private–public
keys.
Note2:All groupmembers use the same time stampT agreed on the public communication
channel by them in advance.
Whereafter, Uj broadcasts
Certj = {CertContj‖Signj } where
{
CertContj = CertContjo‖yj ,
Signj = {rj , sj }.
After receiving certiﬁcates from the other n−1 groupmembers, with the public information
(p, q, g, h, yCA), a group member Uj can authenticate certiﬁcates Certi (1 in, i = j )
in one time as follows:
(1) Extract CertContio and yi from CertConti and then rio from CertContio.
(2) Based on Signi (1 in, i = j ), compute
j = ∑
1 in,i =j
si (mod q), (10)
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j =
∏
1 in,i =j
r
h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u)
io (mod p), (11)
j =
∑
1 in,i =j
h(CertContio)h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u) (mod q), (12)
j = ∏
1 in,i =j
ri (mod p). (13)
(3) Check that
gj = j · y
j
CA · j (mod p). (14)
(4) Accept all Signi (1 in, i = j ) if Eq. (14) holds.
Theorem 2. If yCA, yjo, rjo, sjo, rj , sj , j ,j , j , j are computed according to formulae
(1)–(4) and (8)–(13), then Eq. (14) holds.
Proof. According to formulae (1), (3) and (4), we know that Eq. (5) holds based on
Theorem 1. From formula (9), we have
gsi = g(sio+xio)h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u)gki (mod p) (15)
for any i. From Eq. (5) and formula (2), we infer
gsio+xio = rioyh(CertContio)CA (mod p). (16)
Based on formula (8), combining (15) and (16), we have
gsi = (rioyh(CertContio)CA )h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u)ri (mod p). (17)
Therefore,
g
∑
i =j si =
(∏
i =j
r
h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u)
io
)
· y
∑
i =j h(CertContio)h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u)
CA
∏
i =j
ri (mod p).
(18)
According to formulae (10)–(13), we know Eq. (14) holds. 
Besides verifying all Signi with Eq. (14), Uj should
(1) Verify the current date and time against the validity period (if any) in the certiﬁcate,
relying on a local trusted time/day-clock.
(2) Verify the current validity of the CA’s public key itself.
(3) Verify that the certiﬁcate has not been revoked according to the certiﬁcate revocation
list (CRL).
If Certi (1 in, i = j ) pass all above veriﬁcations, Uj accepts yi (1 in, i = j ) from
the certiﬁcate Certi as Ui’s authentic public key. The peer group G is authenticated after
certiﬁcates of group members are broadcasted and authenticated.
2.2.2. Secret broadcast
Based on the other n − 1 group members’ authentic public keys yi (1 in, i = j ),
each group member Uj randomly chooses a secret integer j such that 1 < j < q and
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compute
j = gj (mod p), (19)
z
(j)
i = y
j
i (mod p), (20)
where 1 in, i = j . Then Uj broadcasts z(j)i (i = j ) in G.
In this phase, the secret of Uj takes form of j . z
(j)
i can be viewed as the encryption
of j under the authentic public key yi of Ui ( in, i = j ). Without the corresponding
secret key xi , it is intractable for an eavesdropper to obtain the secret j from z
(j)
i .
2.2.3. Key derivation
After receiving z(i)j (1 in, i = j ), each group member Uj derives the secret group
key k by computing:
k =
( ∏
1 in,i =j
z
(i)
j
)x−1j
· j =
( ∏
1 in,i =j
gi ·xj
)x−1j
· j
= ∏
1 in
i (mod p), (21)
wherexj ·x−1j = 1 (mod q) andx−1j can be computedwith the extendedEuclidean algorithm
[19,20]. Such k is the best choice of a secret group key for the peer group G because it is
the product of the secrets contributed by all group members.
2.2.4. Key conﬁrmation
Whether the secret group key k is authentic or not is veriﬁed by having a meaningful
message encrypted with the secret group key k under a secret-key cryptosystem broadcasted
by a speciﬁed group member. If each group member can decrypt it into a meaningful
message with k, k is an authentic secret group key. Otherwise, the group should restart the
basic protocol.
Message ﬂow in the above basic protocol can be illustrated in Fig. 4(a).
2.3. Dynamic key agreement protocol
As a supplement to the basic protocol, the dynamic protocol intends to achieve a new
secret group key when member join, mass join, group mergence, group division, member
quit or mass quit occurs in a dynamic peer group.
2.3.1. Member join and mass join
Mass join happens when bringing multiple new users Un+1, Un+2, . . . , Un+m into an
existing peer group Go = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} to form a new peer group G = {U1, U2, . . . ,
Un+m} while member join occurs when adding single new user Un+1 into Go. In fact,
member join can be viewed as a special case of mass join when m = 1.
372 X. Yi / Theoretical Computer Science 326 (2004) 363–382
Fig. 4. (a) Message ﬂow in our basic key agreement protocol, (b) message ﬂow in mass join or member join, (c)
message ﬂow in group mergence, and (d) message ﬂow in group division.
Suppose that Go uses the secret group key ko to secure group communication, a new
group key k for G is achieved as follows:
Group handshake: As described in Section 2.2.1, each group member in G broadcasts
his certiﬁcate and veriﬁes the certiﬁcates of the other n+m− 1 group members.
Secret broadcast: In this phase, group members inGo and new group members broadcast
secrets differently. Each groupmemberUj (1jn) inGo randomly chooses a new secret
integer j such that 1 < j < q and computes j , z
(j)
n+ ( = 1, 2, . . . , m) according to
formulae (19) and (20). With the secret key ko only known in Go, Uj encrypts j into cj
under a secret-key encryption algorithm E, i.e.,
cj = Eko(j ). (22)
Then Uj broadcasts cj , z(j)n+ ( = 1, 2, . . . , m) in G.
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Each new groupmemberUn+ ( = 1, 2, . . . , m) randomly chooses a secret integern+
such that 1 < n+ < q and computes n+, z
(n+)
i (1 in+m, i = n+ ) according
formulae (19) and (20). Then Un+ broadcasts z(n+)i (1 in+m, i = n+ ) in G.
Key derivation: Because of broadcasting secrets differently, group members in Go and
new group members derive the secret group key differently.
After receiving ci (1 in, i = j ), z(n+)j ( = 1, 2, . . . , m), Uj in Go decrypts ci into
i with the secret key ko and computes the new secret group key in the following way:
k =
(
m∏
=1
z
(n+)
j
)x−1j · n∏
i=1
i = (g
∑m
=1 n+·xj )x
−1
j ·
n∏
i=1
i =
n+m∏
i=1
i (mod p).
After receiving z(i)n+ (1 in + m, i = n + ), Un+ computes the secret group key k
according to formula (21).
Key conﬁrmation: The secret group key k is authenticated as described in Section 2.2.4.
Message ﬂow in mass join or member join can be illustrated in Fig. 4(b).
2.3.2. Group mergence
Groupmergence occurswhen two peer groupsG1 = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} andG2 = {Un+1,
Un+2, . . . , Un+m}merge to form a super-groupG = {U1, U2, . . . , Un+m}. Groupmergence
is different from mass join because bothG1 andG2 have already achieved their own secret
group keys before group mergence.
Assume thatGi (i = 1, 2) use the secret group key ki , the new secret group key k for the
super-group G can be achieved as follows:
Group handshake: As described in Section 2.2.1, each group member in G broadcasts
his certiﬁcate and veriﬁes certiﬁcates of the other n+m− 1 group members.
Secret broadcast: Treating G2 as a mass, Uj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in G1 computes and
broadcasts cj (= Ek1(j )), z(j)n+i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m) in the same way as mass join. Treating
G1 as a mass, Un+ ( = 1, 2, . . . , m) inG2 computes and broadcasts cn+(= Ek2(n+)),
z
(n+)
i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the same way as mass join.
Key derivation: Both group members in G1 and group members in G2 derive the new
secret group key k in the same way as group members of Go do in mass join.
Key conﬁrmation: The secret group key k is authenticated as described in Section 2.2.4.
Message ﬂow in group mergence is shown in Fig. 4(c).
2.3.3. Group division
Group division takes place when a peer group is broken up in smaller peer subgroups.
Suppose that G = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} forms a smaller subgroup of Go after group division
of Go. A new secret group key k for G can be achieved as follows.
Group handshake: As described in Section 2.2.1, each group member in G broadcasts
his certiﬁcate and veriﬁes certiﬁcates of the other n− 1 group members.
Secret broadcast: A speciﬁed group member Un computes n, z
(n)
i (1 in − 1)
according to formula (19) and (20) and broadcasts z(n)i (1 in− 1) in G.
Key derivation:After receiving the broadcast message, groupmemberUj (1 j  n−1)
in G extracts n from z
(n)
j with x
−1
j by computing (z
(n)
j )
x−1j = n (mod p). n is the new
secret group key k for G.
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Key conﬁrmation: The secret group key k is authenticated as described in Section 2.2.4.
Message ﬂow in group division is shown in Fig. 4(d).
2.3.4. Member quit and mass quit
Member quit or mass quit takes place when single member or multiple members leave an
existing peer groupGo. After member quit or mass quit, the rest of group can be considered
as a subgroup G ofGo. Similar to group division, a new secret group key k can be achieved
in G.
2.3.5. Key update
In order to limit the amount of ciphertexts available to attackers for a given secret group
key, group keys need to update regular. The secret group key for a peer group G can be
updated in the same way as group division without the group handshake phase by viewing
G itself as a subgroup of G.
3. Security analysis
3.1. Security of certiﬁcate issue and group handshake
In group handshake, each group member Ui generates a pair of one-time private-public
keys (xi, yi) with his original private key xio. The authenticity of one-time public keys for
all group members is veriﬁed by each group member Uj through Eq. (14) in one time.
Theorem 3. Without knowing the private key xCA of CA, if Eq. (14) holds for j, then Eq.
(17) holds for any i (i = j ).
Proof. Let hi1 = h(CertContio) and hi2 = h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u).Without loss of generalization,
we assume that Eq. (17) does not hold only for i = 1, 2, . . . , m when Eq. (14) holds. From
Eq. (14), we can deduce
g
∑m
i=1 si =
(
m∏
i=1
r
hi2
io
)
y
∑m
i=1 hi1hi2
CA
m∏
i=1
ri (mod p). (23)
It occurs when m conspirators {U1, . . . , Um} attempt to impersonate others. Let
rio = gi1yi2CA (mod p), (24)
ri = g	i1y	i2CA (mod p), (25)
then Eq. (23) becomes
g
∑m
i=1 si−i1hi2−	i1 = y
∑m
i=1(hi1+i2)hi2+	i2
CA (mod p). (26)
If
∑m
i=1(hi1 + i2)hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q), from Eq. (26), we know
yCA = g(
∑m
i=1 si−i1hi2−	i1)
(∑m
i=1(hi1+i2)hi2+	i2
)−1
.
This result is in contradiction with the assumption of the theorem and thereby
∑m
i=1(hi1+ i2)hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q).
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hi1 is the hash value of CertContio which contains rio. If these conspirators choose i2
such that hi1 + i2 = 0 (mod q), it is difﬁcult for them to determine i1 from Eq. (24)
with given rio and i2. The difﬁculty is same as that of solving the intractable discrete
logarithm problem. Hence, hi1 + i2 = 0 (mod q) for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. Similarly, if these
conspirators choose 	i2 such that (hi1+i2)hi2+	i2 = 0 (mod q), it is intractable for them
to determine 	i1 fromEq. (25) with given ri and 	i2. Thus, (hi1+i2)hi2+	i2 = 0 (mod q)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
If these conspirators choose
	(m−i)2 = −(h(m−i+1)1 + (m−i+1)2)h(m−i+1)2 (27)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m− 1, then
m∑
i=1
(hi1 + i2)hi2 + 	i2 = (h11 + 12)h12 + 	m2 = 0.
hi2 is the hash value of rio‖ri‖yi‖u. According to formula (27), rm should be given at ﬁrst
in order to compute 	(m−1)2 and 	m2 = −(h11 + 12)h12 (mod q) is determined at last.
With given rm and 	m2, it is hard for these conspirators to determine 	m1 from Eq. (25). This
problem exists nomatter how these conspirators choosei1,i2, 	i1, 	i2 (i = 1, 2, . . . , m).
Therefore, it is intractable for these conspirators to ﬁndi1,i2,	i1,	i2 (i = 1, 2, . . . , m)
satisfying Eq. (26) with∑mi=1(hi1 + i2)hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q) if Eq. (17) does not hold
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. Thus, the theorem is true. 
Theorem 4. Without knowing the discrete logarithm of rioyhi1CA over base g, it is intractable
to forge rio,CertContio, yi, ri , si satisfying Eq. (17).
Proof. Let
gi = rioyhi1CA (mod p), (28)
ri = g	i1g	i2i (mod p), (29)
then Eq. (17) becomes
gsi−	i1 = ghi2+	i2i (mod p). (30)
If hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q), then from Eq. (30), we infer
g(si−	i )(hi2+	i2)−1 = gi (mod p). (31)
This result contradicts with the assumption of the theorem. Thus hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q).
However, if one chooses 	i2 such that hi2 + 	i2 = 0 (mod q), it is difﬁcult for him to
determine 	i1 from Eq. (29) with given ri and 	i2. Therefore, the theorem is true. 
Suppose that Ui knows the discrete logarithm x of gi over base g, i.e.,
gi = gx (mod p) (32)
then Ui can randomly choose an integer xio such that 1 < xio < q and let
sio = x − xio (mod q),
yio = gxio (mod p).
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Afterwards, Eq. (32) becomes
gsio = y−1io gi (mod p),
i.e.,Ui knows yio, rio, sio satisfying Eq. (5) with knowing xio such that yio = gxio (mod p).
Theorem 5. Without knowing the private key xCA of CA, it is intractable to forge yio, rio,
CertContio, sio satisfying Eq. (5) with knowing xio such that yio = gxio (mod p).
Proof. If one can forge yio, rio,CertContio, sio satisfying Eq. (5) with knowing xio such
that yio = gxio (mod p), then Eq. (5) becomes
gsio−xio = rioyhi1CA . (33)
With Eq. (24), we infer
gsio−xio−i1 = yhi1+i2CA . (34)
If hi1 + i2 = 0 (mod q), we can further deduce
g(sio−xio−i1)(hi1+i2)−1 = yCA. (35)
This result contradicts with the assumption of the theorem. Thus hi1 + i2 = 0 (mod q).
However, if the forger chooses i2 such that hi1 + i2 = 0 (mod q), it is difﬁcult for him
to determine i1 from Eq. (24) with given rio and i2. Therefore, the theorem is true. 
For Uj , if Eq. (14) holds, Theorems 3–5 guarantee
(1) Ui (1 in, i = j ) is authentic because only Ui holds Certio satisfying Eq. (5) with
knowing xio such that yio = gxio (mod p) and thereby only Ui can generate Certi
satisfying Eq. (17).
(2) Ui (1 in, i = j ) agrees to join the current peer group described with u because
u is inside h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u) in Eq. (17). Replying attack cannot work during the group
handshake phase because a time stamp T is included in u.
(3) The binding between the identity of Ui (1 in, i = j ) explained by CertContio
and the one-time public key yi generated by Ui is authentic because yi is inside
h(rio‖ri‖yi‖u) in Eq. (17).
3.2. Security of our basic protocol
Threats to a key agreement protocol mainly come from passive and active attacks. A
passive attack involves an adversary who attempts to determine the secret key by simply
recording data and thereafter analyzing it. An active attack involves an adversary who
attempts to masquerade as a legal user by altering or replaying messages.
In our basic protocol, suppose that a passive adversary eavesdrops z(j)i for any i, j ∈ [1, n]
(i = j ) being transmitted over the public broadcast channel.Without knowing the one-time
private key of any group member, the passive adversary cannot extract j from z
(j)
i for any
i, j ∈ [1, n] and determine k based on formula (21). Therefore, our basic protocol is able
to withstand the passive attack.
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Next, suppose an active adversary attempts to impersonate Ui in our basic protocol.
According to Theorem 4, without knowing the discrete logarithm of gj over g, the active
adversary is unable to generate Certi satisfying Eq. (17) and thereby Eq. (14) does not
hold. Group members can detect the active attack by checking whether Eq. (14) holds or
not during the handshake phase. Hence, our basic protocol can also prevent from the active
attack.
Our basic protocol is message-independent [23] in the sense that the messages sent by
each group member are independent of any message received from other group members.
In this aspect, our basic protocol excels GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2.
Our basic protocol offers explicit group key authentication in terms of both group key
authentication and group key conﬁrmation holding. Group key authentication is the property
whereby one group member is assured that no other users aside from those speciﬁcally
identiﬁed groupmembersmay gain access to a particular secret key. Group key conﬁrmation
is the property whereby one group member is assured that the rest of the group actually
have possession of a particular secret key. In our basic protocol, group key authentication
is achieved in the secret broadcast phase. When broadcasting z(j)i (1 in, i = j ), each
group member Uj is actually sure that only the rest of group may get access to the secret
j because the extraction of this secret from z
(j)
i (1 in, i = j ) requires the one-time
private key xi of Ui . Group key conﬁrmation is obtained in the key conﬁrmation phase of
our basic protocol.
Our basic protocol has perfect forward secrecy.A protocol is said to have perfect forward
secrecy if compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys. In our
basic protocol, the long-term key of an userUj is sjo+xjo which is just employed to certify
the authenticity of one-time public keys of Uj . The corresponding one-time private keys of
Uj are randomly chosen and thus independent of the long-term key sjo + xjo. Even if the
long-term keys sjo + xjo (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) of all group members are compromised, their
past one-time private keys are not revealed to the attacker. Without any one-time private
key, past secrets i (1 in) cannot be extracted from z(i)j (1 i, jn) and hence past
secret group keys cannot be determined with formula (21). Therefore, our basic protocol
has perfect forward secrecy.
3.3. Security of our dynamic protocol
Since our dynamic protocol is built on our basic protocol, it is obvious that our dynamic
protocol inherits all the properties of our basic protocol described in the last section. Besides
them, our dynamic protocol has the key independence property in the sense that
(1) a group member does not know the secret key used before he joins the group;
(2) a former group member does not know the secret key being used in the group after he
quits the group.
In our dynamic protocol for member join or mass join, suppose that the secret key used
in the group before member join or mass join is ko = ∏ni=1 (0)i = g∑ni=1 (0)i (mod p)
while the secret key used in the group after member join or mass join is k = ∏n+mj=1 j =
g
∑n+m
j=1 j (mod p). k is independent of ko because (0)i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and j (j =
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1, 2, . . . , n+m) are randomly chosen and thereby independent each other. Therefore, new
members do not know the secret key ko used before they joins the group.
Similarly, in our dynamic protocol for group mergence, the new secret group key k =∏n+m
i=1 i after the mergence of two groupsG1 andG2 is dependent of the secret group key
k1 = ∏ni=1 (1)i used in G1 and the secret group key k2 = ∏n+mi=n+1 (2)i used in G2 before
group mergence. Therefore, group members in G1 do not know k2 while group members
in G2 do not know k1.
In our dynamic protocol for group division, although a group memberUn in the subgroup
is speciﬁed to distribute a new secret key to other groupmembers in the subgroup,Un cannot
collude with any userUt to allowUt to impersonate a role ofUj (Uj = Ut ) in the subgroup
as described in the collusion attack to A-GDH.2 in Section 1. This attack can be detected
by other group members during the group handshake phase because
(1) Ut cannot reply a past certiﬁcate Certj of Uj because a time stamp is tied with u.
(2) Ut cannot produce a new certiﬁcate Certj of Uj satisfying Eq. (14) without knowing
the long-term key sjo + xjo of Uj .
In addition, only group members in the subgroup can derive the new secret key n with
their private keys xj through (z(n)j )
x−1j = n (mod p).
In our dynamic protocol for member quit or mass quit, a former groupmemberU
 cannot
derive the new secret key n from the broadcasting message for member quit or mass quit
because z(n)
 is not broadcasted by Un. Hence, U
 does not know the secret key being used
in the group after he quits the group.
In our key update protocol, the group handshake phase is not necessary because the group
remain unchanged and the updated secret key is independent of the previous one.
4. Performance analysis
Our authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for dynamic peer groups with
relatively small sizes n. Under this premise, the number of modular multiplications, addi-
tions and subtractions bound by n in our protocol is also relatively small. Compared with
modular exponentiations, the computation complexity of these modular multiplications,
additions and subtractions can be neglected. For simplicity, we will only consider modular
exponentiations of our protocols in this section.
4.1. Performance analysis of our basic protocol
In the group handshake phase, each groupmemberUj needs to generate signj = {rj , sj }
with two modular exponentiations respectively in formulae (7) and (8) and verify Certi
(1 in, i = j ) with n − 1 modular exponentiations in formula (11) and two modular
exponentiations in Eq. (14).
In the secret broadcast phase, Uj is required to compute j and z
(j)
i with n modular
exponentiations respectively in formulae (19) and (20).
In the key derivation phase, Uj uses one modular exponentiation to derive the secrete
key k through formula (21).
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Table 1
Performance of our dynamic protocol for each group member (l = |p| and  = |Certj |)
Items Exponentiations required Messages broadcasted (bits)
Mass join or member join Old member: n+ 2m+ 5 Old member: + (1+m)l
New member: 2(n+m)+ 4 New member: + (n+m− 1)l
Mass mergence Member in G1: n+ 2m+ 5 Member in G1: + (1+m)l
Member in G2: 2n+m+ 5 Member in G2: + (1+ n)l
Group division Member Un: 2n+ 4 Member Un: + (n− 1)l
Other member: n+ 4 Other member: 
Therefore, the number of modular exponentiations required for Uj to execute our basic
protocol is
2+ (n− 1)+ 2+ n+ 1 = 2n+ 4.
Suppose prime p has l bits while Certj has  bits, then two messages, Certj and z(j)i
(1 in, i = j ), broadcasted by Uj have totally
+ (n− 1)l (bits).
Both of the above evaluations are applied to each group member. Our basic protocol
is contributory in the sense that each group member equally contributes to the group key
k =∏ni=1 i (mod p) and guarantees its freshness.
4.2. Performance analysis of our dynamic protocol
In our dynamic protocol, the number of exponentiations required for each group member
and the length of messages broadcasted by each group member are listed in Table 1.
4.3. Comparison with IKA.1 and SA-GDH.2
IKA.1 [31] and SA-GDH.2 [1] are not message-independent. They have to be executed
in series. In SA-GDH.2, after a group member receives a message with nl bits from the
foregoing group member, he needs compute 2(n − 1) modular exponentiations and sends
another message with nl bits to the subsequent group member. The group key cannot be
determined until the last group member Un broadcasts a message with (n− 1)l bits. There-
fore, the running time of SA-GDH.2 is the time required to transmit n messages in series
with total (n2−1)l bits and compute 2n(n−1)+1 modular exponentiations or n(n−1)+1
modular exponentiations if each group member Uj precomputesKij (1 in, i = j ) and
(
∏
1 in,i =j Kij )−1 (mod p).
Different from IKA.1 and SA-GDH.2, our basic protocol is message-independent. There-
fore, each group member can run in parallel. The comparison among IKA.1, SA-GDH.2
and our basic protocol is shown in Table 2.
Note: If the group handshake phase is not considered, the running time of our basic
protocol is just the time required to broadcast n messages with total (n − 1)nl bits and
compute n+ 1 modular exponentiations.
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Table 2
Comparison among IKA.1, SA-GDH.2 and our basic protocol for each group member (l = |p| and  = |Certj |)
Items IKA.1 SA-GDH.2 Our basic protocol
Authenticity of No Yes Yes
secret group key
Authenticity of No Yes
long-term key
Length of messages n(n+1)2 l (n2 − 1)l n+ n(n− 1)l
exchanged (bits)
Message-independent No No Yes
Exchange method In series In series In parallel
Running time of Ui i + 1 2(n− 1)+ 1 2n+ 4
(exponentiations)
Computing method In series In series In parallel
Running time 2n(n− 1)+ 1
of protocol n(n+1)2 (or n2 − n+ 1 2n+ 4
(exponentiations) with precomp.)
IKA.1, SA-GDH.2 and our basic protocol for static groups are all contributory.
SA-GDH.2 for dynamic groups, which are omitted in [1], are straight-forward extensions
of Auxiliary Key Agreement (AKA) protocols in [30]. Among AKA operations, member
addition, mass join and group fusion are contributory. However, member exclusion, sub-
group exclusion and key refresh are centralized key distribution. Same as AKA operations,
our member join, mass join and group mergence are contributory, but our group division,
member quit, mass quit and key update are centralized key distribution.
Overall, SA-GDH.2 for member addition, mass join, group fusion and our dynamic
protocol for member join, mass join, group mergence need to exchange almost the same
length of messages and compute almost the same number of exponentiations in total.
Note: In this comparison, the handshake phase of our dynamic protocol is not considered
because the authenticity of long-term keys for both old and new members is not considered
in SA-GDH.2.
SA-GDH.2 for member exclusion or subgroup exclusion requires the group controller to
broadcast only a nl-bit message (where n is the number of current members and l = |p|).
Besides the group handshake, our dynamic protocol for member quit or mass quit needs a
speciﬁed member to broadcast a nl-bit message. In this case, SA-GDH.2 is more efﬁcient
than our dynamic protocol. However, if the group controller is not trusted, SA-GDH.2 for
subgroup exclusion is vulnerable to the collusion attack, in which an attacker impersonates
a member who has left to participate in the secure group communication by colluding with
the group controller, similar as described in Section 1.
SA-GDH.2 for key refresh and our dynamic protocol for key update have the same
performance.
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5. Conclusion
Increasing uses of group-oriented applications in distributed systems stimulates the needs
for authenticated key agreement protocols for dynamic peer groups. Such a protocol, SA-
GDH.2, was proposed in [1]. However, SA-GDH.2 is carried out in series and so the running
time of SA-GDH.2 is n times as long as that of a group member to run.
In this paper, we come up with a new authenticated key agreement protocol, composed
of the basic protocol and the dynamic protocol, for dynamic peer groups. With the basic
protocol, a secret group key can be achieved in a peer group via group handshake, secret
broadcast, key derivation and key conﬁrmation phases. By the dynamic protocol, a new
secret group key can be reached when member join, mass join, group mergence, group
division, member quit, mass quit or key update occurs in a dynamic peer group.
Security analysis of our authenticated key agreement protocol shows that
1. Our protocol is able to withstand both the passive attack and the active attack.
2. Our protocol has perfect forward secrecy.
3. Our protocol is message-independent.
4. Our protocol offers explicit group key authentication.
5. Our dynamic protocol has key independence property.
Performance analysis of our authenticated key agreement protocol shows that
1. Our protocol is carried out in parallel.
2. Same as SA-GDH.2, our basic protocol and dynamic protocol for member join, mass
join and group mergence are contributory, but our dynamic protocol for group division,
member quit, mass quit and key update are centralized key distribution.
3. Our basic protocol is more efﬁcient than SA-GDH.2 in terms of running time.
Design of authenticated key agreement protocols for dynamic peer groups is a chal-
lenge. Our future work is further enhancing the security and improving the performance of
authenticated key agreement protocols for dynamic peer group.
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